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Recently many experts have recognized the growing economic power of Brazil. The country now 
belongs to the so called BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), acronym of these five 
emerging powers, and is currently trying to strongly modernize its society and economy. The country 
has had a regular and sustained growth in recent years (7.5% in 2010), which allowed him to climb to 
eighth place in the GDP World ranking in early 2011. Brazilians already called the next decade "the 
golden decade of Brazil." 
Brazil believes in the possibility to become global and economically powerful through the 
organization of international events. Everything began in 2007 with the Pan Americans games in Rio 
de Janeiro. In 2009 and 2011 Brazil has successively obtained the organization of the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Never has a country obtained the 
organization of the two biggest sport events in the world two years apart. This success is the result of 
an extraordinary will to strengthen the power of the country at regional and global levels based on 
the idea that organizing such events will be profitable for the country’s economy and influence.  
 
In fact many countries (Japan in 1964, South Korea in 1988, Spain in 1992 or South Africa in 2010 for 
example) have relied on the organization of major sport events as a springboard for economical and 
social progress with varying degrees of success. Indeed, the organization of events in this way does 
not necessarily guarantee a financial windfall for the host country and can even generate social 
imbalances. What about Brazil? Will the dual organization of the 2014 World Cup and Olympic 
Games in 2016 maximize the benefits of these major events, or is it a risk in terms of investments 
and resources consumption? However, Brazil has little time to turn these events into success: the 
main challenges are the needed renovation of stadiums, the construction of airport infrastructures 
and hotels, and also a strong attention given to security measures. 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to try to analyze the economic viability of these events themselves and also 
their impacts (positive and/or negative) on Brazilian economy, society and influence across the 
world. The first part of the thesis will be dedicated to an economic and financial analysis of a FIFA 
World Cup and an Olympic Games. Attention will be given to the same events previously organized in 
the world (South Africa 2010, Beijing 2008…). In the second part of the thesis will be discussed the 
potential impact of the organizations of these events on the Brazilian economy, the analysis will be 
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focused on the differences between structural and contextual changes. Finally the thesis will be 
about the impacts of these events on the social contract in Brazil. The question of a potential danger 
for the national cohesion will be asked. 
The basis of the analysis of the impacts on Brazil economy and society of the organization of the two 
events will be the official estimates published in governmental agencies’ reports (Ministry of Sport 
etc.). GDP will be the main economic indicator to be analyzed along with the balance of trade. The 
method used in these reports is based on the Multiplier Effect method.  
Of course official reports are also a mean for public authorities to legitimate their former choice to 
bid for the organization of these events that is why the figures disclosed might be too much optimist. 
The value added of this thesis will be to use former independent reports on previous Olympic Games 
and FIFA World Cup to challenge these official figures. 
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II. Economics of FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games organization 
 
In order to study the economical consequences of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic 
Games in Brazil it is necessary to analyze the economics of a FIFA Men’s World Cup and an Olympic 
Games tournament. This first part also aims to understand these subjects without paying attention to 
the eventual consequences of the organization of these events on the local economy. FIFA Men’s 
World Cup economics will be studied first, then the Olympic Games economics and finally the 
outcomes of the recent FIFA Men’s World Cups and Olympic Games. 
 
A. FIFA World Cup Economics 
 
FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) is the international governing structure of 
football. This is a federation of local football associations (Federação Portuguesa de Futebol, 
Fédération Française de Football…). The legal structure of FIFA is an “association according to Art. 60 
ff. Swiss Civil Code” and its headquarters are in Zürich. FIFA is in charge of the organization of one of 
the biggest sport event and major international tournament in the world: FIFA World Cup. As such 
FIFA is the owner of trademarks such as 2010 FIFA World Cup™, 2014 FIFA World Cup™ etc. The 
tournament organized each four years is the main event of the FIFA. It represents quasi exclusive 
source of revenues for FIFA. For example over the 2007-2010 period 93% of the FIFA’s revenues were 
related to football events of which 92% for the sole 2010 South Africa World Cup. These figures are 
relatively the same for previous periods. 
Graph.1 FIFA revenues repartition (2007-2010) 
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1. Organization framework of a men’s FIFA World Cup 
 
“FIFA works with a four-year financial period, beginning on 1st January of the year following each FIFA 
World Cup™”2. The organization of each World Cup is delegated to a Local Organizing Committee 
(LOC). This committee is composed of (i) a management board, in which FIFA Secretary General has 
to be present, and (ii) a group of directors mainly composed of representatives of the local 
government, representatives of the local football association, representatives of FIFA and also 
influent persons from the labor and business community. These directors can also be divided into 
several sub-committees divided by subjects (finance, legal…). The legal structure of this committee 
can be chosen by each organizing country but an agreement describing the economic and legal 
relationships between the committee and FIFA must be signed.   
In order to fully comprehend the economic systems involved in the organization of a recent FIFA 
World Cup, our analysis must be divided in two levels: (i) FIFA and (ii) Local Organizing Committee. 
Each of these entities has its own World Cup related economic model. 
2. FIFA & LOC: Two economic models 
 
FIFA derives revenues related to its World Cup from TV rights, marketing rights, hospitality rights and 
licensing rights. These revenues are generated by contracts which can guarantee a fix payment 
(royalties) or a minimum payment plus a share of the profit made by the partner. The expenses 
supported by FIFA and related to the event are prize money, contributions to the LOC, TV production, 
benefits for football clubs (the football clubs which employ players involved in the tournament get 
compensation depending on how long the player has stayed in the competition)  and other operating 
costs (travel, insurance, refereeing matters etc.). Profit remain inside FIFA although in some 
particular cases (2010 South Africa World Cup) a part of this profit can be distributed to a Legacy 
Trust which is a non-profit organization financed only by FIFA’s World Cup profit and aiming to 





                                                          
2
 Source: 2006 FIFA Financial Report 
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Table.1 FIFA World Cup™ Income Statement template 
 
 
The Local Organizing Committee derives revenues from three sources: (i) ticketing (management of 
ticketing is supported by FIFA but all the revenues are then transferred to the LOC), (ii) FIFA 
contribution (cash payments and value-in-kind) and (iii) sponsorship from official suppliers. The 
expenses supported by the LOC are all the expenses related to the stadium operations (rental, 
security, power supplier…) and other operating expenses (human resources, transport, marketing, 
insurance…). The eventual profit generated is split between FIFA (around 30% of profit share) and 
the local football association. 
Table.2 Local Organizing Committee Income Statement template3 
 
                                                          
3
 Source : 2010 FIFA Financial Report 
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In order to have a comprehensive view of FIFA World Cup economics it is necessary to produce a 
consolidated income statement. The two figures below present a scheme of the relationships 
between the different entities involved in the organization of a World Cup tournament and a 
consolidated Income Statement template. 
Graph.2 Organization scheme LOC - FIFA 
 
Table.3 FIFA World Cup™ Consolidated Income Statement 
 
Recently the World Cup related profit acquired a new role, as FIFA is trying to radically change the 
way it funds its activities. Until 2006 FIFA pre-World Cup activities were funded with debt that was 
paid back thanks to the revenues generated by FIFA World Cup (TV rights, marketing rights…). After 
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the 2002 World Cup in Japan and Korea, FIFA decided to change the way its activities were funded by 
the reinforcement of its equity position thanks to the incorporation of reserves. The objective was to 
switch from a debt financing to an equity financing in order to secure an equity basis and so to 
decrease the dependency of the organization to its World Cup. The accumulation of capital needed 
for this change may explain the increase in TV rights revenues from 2002. 
Graph.3 FIFA Financing Situation4 
 
This major change has been successful. The FIFA’s equity has been increasing constantly since 2003 
thanks to the incorporation of reserves (capital has remained stable at $ 4 million). This trend has 
allowed FIFA to fund its 2010 World Cup (2007-2010 periods) activities only with proper resources. 
Graph.4 FIFA Liabilities Evolution 
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B. Olympic Games Economics 
 
The whole Olympic activities are directly or indirectly controlled by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC). The IOC is a Swiss association ruled by the Swiss law which headquarters are based 
in Lausanne. The mission of the IOC is to lead and promote the “Olympic Movement” which has as 
centerpiece the organization the forth-yearly winter and summer Olympic Games, but also to 
promote the values of Olympic, support the sport development all over the world and lead the so-
called “Olympic Movement”. 
1. The Olympic Movement’s organization 
 
 This Olympic Movement gathers all the organizations and athletes who adhere to the Olympic 
Charter that is the founder document of the IOC. The organizations which are members of the 
Movement are, in addition to the IOC, the different international sports federations (IFs) and the 
national Olympic committee (NOCs). The executive organ of the IOC is its executive commission 
which gathers fifteen members and rules the other operating commissions (Finance, Marketing, 
Sport Development, Olympic Games etc.). 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement. It 
coordinates the activities of all the organizations of the movement (IFs, NOCs but also some Olympic 
foundations and agencies) 
International Sports Federations (IFs) are non-governmental organizations which aim to 
administrate the development and the organization across the world of a specific sport (FIFA for 
example is one of these IFs) 
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) are the representative of the Olympic Movement at a national 
scale. Their mission is to promote and develop the Movement in their countries. They are the 
organizations responsible, with the IOC, to create the so-called Organizing Committees of Olympic 
Games (OCOGs) directly responsible for the organization of Olympic Games in a city. Each NOC 
belongs to a regional association gathering all the NOCs on a geographic basis (the European Olympic 
Committees in Europe for example). 
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Graph.5 Olympic Movement’s Organization  
 
2. The organization of the Games 
 
The organization of the Games is delegated by the IOC to a city (not a country) seven years before 
the effective date of the Games. Once a city has been chosen to organize the next Olympic Games, 
the IOC delegates the administration and the organization of the event to the National Olympic 
Committee of the country in which the city is located as well as the city itself. 
This mandate is formally organized under a common agreement: the Host City Contract which settles 
the rules of the partnership between the IOC, the NOC and the city during the organization of the 
Games. 
 In agreement with the IOC the NOC has to form an Organizing Committee (OCOG). The whole 
organization of the Games will be looked after by this committee which will receive instructions and 
financing from and report directly to the IOC. The executive organ of this committee has to include at 
least some members of the IOC, the President and the Secretary General of the concerned NOC and 
representative of the city. In general this committee also includes representatives from the public 
authorities and national prestigious figures (well-known athletes etc.). 
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The organization of the entire operating part of the Games is exclusively held by the local OCOG 
thanks to its revenues (see below). The rest of the organization which consists in providing the city 
chosen with the full infrastructures and venues needed is organized by the city in cooperation with 
the OCOG, the different public authorities and sometimes the private sector. These investments 
(merely infrastructural) are not funded by the OCOG but by public authorities and/or private sector 
and are often realized in the first three years of preparation. This part of the thesis will only focus on 
the economics of the OCOG so on the operating part of the organization. 
Graph.6 The Olympic Games Organization 
 
3. IOC & OCOG: Expenses and revenues 
 
The IOC derives its revenues from two sources: (i) the sale of broadcasting rights and (ii) the 
worldwide marketing and sponsorship program (TOP). 
The IOC is responsible for the commercialization of all broadcasting rights (TV, mobile, Internet) 
related to Olympic Movements events. The objective is to maximize the revenue in order to ensure 
the financial support of the Olympic Movement’s organization but also to maximize the worldwide 
coverage of these events. Long-term contracts are signed between the IOC and the different 
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broadcasting associations around the world securing recurrent incomes for the IOC. The broadcasting 
production is entirely managed by the IOC through its subsidiary the Olympic Broadcasting Services.  
The IOC’s sponsorship program, also called TOP, is the worldwide sponsorship activity of the 
organization. This program was created in 1985 with the mission to provide Olympic organizations 
with a secured long-term sponsorship program allowing the different OCOGs to have a sure basis of 
revenues during the four years of preparation previously to the Olympic Games. The program 
consists in a contract signed between the IOC and a corporation (which become a Worldwide 
Olympic Partner) for a four-year period (quadrennium). “The TOP program provides each Worldwide 
Olympic Partner with exclusive global marketing rights and opportunities within a designated product 
or service category. The global marketing rights include partnerships with the IOC, all active NOCs 
and their Olympic teams, and the two OCOGs and the Games of each quadrennium. The TOP Partners 
may exercise these rights worldwide and may activate marketing initiatives with all the members of 
the Olympic Movement that participate in the TOP program.”5 The worldwide Olympic partners for 
the 2009-2012 periods are eleven (Coca-Cola, Acer, Atos, Dow, GE, MacDonald’s, Omega, Panasonic, 
P&G, Samsung, and VISA).  
The IOC distributes during each Olympic period (the four years prior to the Games) around 90% of its 
revenues to the organizations which belong to the Olympic Movement including of course the 
OCOGs (which receive around 60% of the total amount distributed). This income represents around 
50% of a total OCOG’s budget. 
Graph.7 IOC’s Repartition of Revenues (2001 -2008) 
 
The funding of the operating part of the Games is organized exclusively through the local Organizing 
Committee of the Games. All the infrastructures built on the occasion of the Games (stadia, Olympic 
                                                          
5
 In 2010 IOC Marketing Report. www.olympic.org 
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Village, airports, metro, highways etc.) are excluded from the economical analysis of this part of the 
thesis since they are looked after by public authorities (governments, region, city etc.) and often still 
being used after the end of the Games. The OCOGs are namely exclusively privately funded. This is a 
relative new situation in fact in the 70’s and 80’s the OCOGs were mainly funded with public money. 
The revenues of the OCOG come from two major sources: the International Organizing Committee 
funding (see above) and the domestic commercial revenues. The domestic commercial revenues 
include the sales of tickets, the licensing programs around the brand name (London 2012, Rio 2016 
etc.) and the domestic sponsorships. All these programs are managed directly by the OCOG but 
supervised by the IOC executive commission which controls the compatibility of all these programs 
with the IOC’s own sponsorship programs. “The Olympic Games domestic sponsorship program 
grants marketing rights within the host country or territory only. The host country NOC and the host 
country Olympic team participate in the OCOG sponsorship program because the Marketing Plan 
Agreement requires the OCOG and the host country NOC to centralize and coordinate all marketing 
initiatives within the host country. Domestic OCOG sponsorship programs usually include several tiers 
of partnership, which may include sponsors, suppliers and providers.”6 
The IOC tries to negotiate each contract it signs (broadcasting, sponsorship) in order to cover all the 
operating costs of the OCOGs. The past Olympic Games show that between 40% and 60% of a total 
OCOG’s budget is covered thanks to the money coming from the IOC. 
Excluding all the investments in infrastructures and venues (Olympic Village, Stadia etc.) that are paid 
by public authorities and/or private organizations, the Games-related costs are fully covered by the 
OCOGs. These costs are only organizational and administrative. The most important costs are those 
linked with Human Resources (around 15% of the total operating expenditures), followed by all the 
information systems, the operation of the different venues (power supply, security etc in Olympic 
Village and stadia), the opening and closing ceremonies related costs and the hosting charge of the 
Olympic Movement’s personnel.  
Previously to the staging of the Games agreements are signed between the IOC, the concerned NOC, 
the OCOG and local authorities setting up the rules in case of a shortfall or a profit after the Games 
end. The past experiences show that in case of a profit, the surplus is shared between the IOC (often 
up to the percentage of IOC’s funding in the total budget of the OCOG), the local NOC and a legacy. 
After the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, which led to a huge debt shared between the IOC, the 
Canadian NOC and the city of Montreal, the IOC now asks for financial guarantee from all public 
                                                          
6
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authorities in case of shortfall. Most of the time deficits are paid by local authorities and government 
thanks to tax increases and/or public borrowings. In some special cases and especially when the 
deficit is forecasted before the beginning of the Games the IOC can step in and participate to the 
refunding of deficit mainly by looking for new worldwide commercial partners. This was the case 
during 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. 
 
C. Outcomes of previous events  
 
In this part the analysis will focus on the Olympic Games economical results (the OCOGs results) from 
the 2004 and 2008 editions in Athens and Beijing and also on the 2006 and 2010 editions of FIFA 
World Cup in Germany and South Africa. 
1. In “rich countries” 
 
2004 Athens Olympic Games: the local OCOG was responsible for the entire operating organization 
of the games like for the previous games while public authorities took care of the needed 
infrastructures (Olympic Village, new airport…). The final budget of the OCOG was set up at € 1.9 bn 
with a Greek State’s participation of € 235 M. 
Table.4 Evolution of Athen’s OCOG budget7 
 
                                                          
7
 Source : Athens OCOG Official Report 
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After the Games a budget surplus of 130 M€ was made. Among these 130 M€, 123 M€ were given 
back to the Greek State following a previous agreement that stated that the OCOG would have to 
participate to “series of actions, such as covering expropriation expenditures, which were deemed 
necessary for the hosting of the Games, and always on instructions of the Greek State”8 in case of a 
final surplus. A final profit of € 7 million has also been calculated.  The total cost of staging the 
Olympics (including public investments) reached € 9 bn. 





                                                          
8
 Source: Athens OCOG Official Report. p. 520 
9
 Source : Athens OCOG Official Report 
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Table.6 Impact of Athens Olympics on GDP10 
 
The impact of the Olympics on the Greek economy has been positive all along the years after the 
event. The average contribution to the GDP growth is around 0.5%. This data will be used later to 
assess the validity of the economic forecasts disclosed by Brazilian public authorities 
 
2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: The total financial balance for FIFA (FIFA revenues and expenses 
linked with 2006 Germany FIFA World Cup™) was CHF 1.977 million. 
Table.7 2006 FIFA World Cup™ Related Income Statement (2003-2006)11 
 
The German organizing committee generated a net profit of € 156 millions. This amount was shared 
between FIFA (29%) and the LOC which distributed this money to the German football association as 
well as to German sport foundations. FIFA had contributed (including ticketing) up to 80% of the total 
revenues generated by the LOC. 
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 Source : http://www.invgr.com/indicators   
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 Source : FIFA 2006 Financial Report 
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Graph.8 German LOC Income Statement12 
 
Four different studies were disclosed before the beginning of the event aiming to estimate the 
impact of the World Cup on the German economy. In a study published in 2005 Ahlert13 uses a 
simulation model called Sport, using the Input-Output method. The results of this study believe that 
German GDP would increase by about € 1.75 billion, which represents only 0.05% of the predicted 
GDP in 2007. It was also forecasted that 1.1 million foreign tourists would travel to Germany for the 
Cup injecting around € 909 million in the national economy. In a study published in 2006 a German 
Chamber of Commerce states that the World Cup would add around € 10 billion into the GDP (Davis, 
2006)14. The German Football Association published a study which forecasts a net economic benefit 
of € 2.5 billion (Brenke and Wagner, 2006)15. The Credit Suisse in a study published in 2005 estimated 
that the direct impact of World Cup football on the German economy remain moderate (about 0.2 to 
0.5% of GDP). The differences between all these estimations highlight the difficulty of determining 
the monetary impact of such an event before it has started. Regarding the public money invested in 
infrastructures, securities etc for the World Cup, official figures announce a total amount of € 4 
billion that seems reliable.  
Finally the figures of the Deutsche Bundesbank report for the second quarter of 2006 an increase in 
GDP growth of 0.25% related to the World Cup. In the third quarter, household final consumption 
increased by 0.7%, which contributes 0.4% to GDP growth. This represents a total amount of roughly 
€ 6 billion. The tournament also attracted around 2 million of foreign tourists (this represents a 25% 
increase regarding the previous figures for this period) who spent around € 600 million in Germany.  
                                                          
12
 Source : FIFA 2006 Financial Report 
13
 Ahlert, G. (2005). What does Germany expect to gain from hosting the 2006 Football World Cup?, GWS  
Discussion Paper Series, Onsnabreuk, Germany: Institute of Economic Structures Research 
14
 Davis, O. (2006). World Cup 2006 Economics, Associated Content 
15
 Brenke, K. and Wagner, G. (2006) The Soccer World Cup in Germany. Weekly Report No 3, Berlin: 
German Institute for Economic Research 
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This data will be used later to assess the validity of the economic forecasts disclosed by Brazilian 
public authorities 
 
2. In “emerging countries” 
 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games: According to its official report the Chinese Organizing Committee 
made a profit of $ 146 million (income of ¥ 20.5 bn and expenses of ¥ 19.34 bn). The costs supported 
by the Committee were higher than expected but this has been covered by higher revenues from 
domestic sponsorships (total revenues reached around $ 3bn. whereas “only” $ 2bn. was expected). 
There are no official figures about the total public investments made in relation with the Games but 
some experts evaluate them around $ 40bn.16 
2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: The total financial balance for FIFA was positive. Revenues 
derived from the 2010 FIFA World Cup™ was over $ 3.5 bn (without ticketing) to be compared with 
total costs of $ 1.3 bn which means a net profit of $ 2.2 bn. 
Table.8 2010 FIFA World Cup™ Related Income Statement (2007-20010)17 
 
 
The Local Organizing Committee made a light profit of $ 10 million. This money was given to South 
African charities and to the South African Football Association.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 ANDREW ZIMBALIST – Circling The Basis, Essays on the Challenges and Prospects of the Sport Industry (2011) 
17
 Source : FIFA 2010 Financial Report 
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Looking at these figures for the XXI century events, Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups seem 
“profitable”. Both in “rich countries” and “emerging countries” the organizing committees got a final 
positive balance. This highlights the fact that the financial outcomes of organizing committees do not 
seem to depend on the level of economic development of the organizing countries. In fact reaching a 
balanced final account only depends on the ability of the concerned countries to adjust their 
expenses on their projected revenues.   
However these figures do not take into accounts all the public investments made to organize these 
events. They neither do take into account all the consequences on local economies. To fully 
understand the impacts of such events on a local economy and society it is necessary to analyze all 
the eventual consequences and expenses. In fact it is important to distinguish between the analysis 
of Organizing Committees budgetary balance (that could be considered as financial or operating) and 
the wider impact of these events on the whole national economy. These impacts that derive from 
private and public investments are associated with factors such as better infrastructure or increase in 
tourism. This is what will be discussed in the next part along with a slight look on the projected 
budgets of the Brazilian LOC (FIFA World Cup) and the Brazilian OCOG (Olympic Games). 
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 Source : FIFA 2010 Financial Report 
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III. Economics of the events 
 
Brazil will host the next FIFA World Cup in 2014 and also the 2014 Olympic Games in Rio. In this part 
will be analyzed the economics of these two sport mega-events. 
 
A. The Brazilian LOC’s budget (FIFA World Cup) 
 
Brazil will host the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The situation is a bit special for two different reasons: (i) the 
fact that Brazil was the only candidate country at the moment of the final vote of FIFA 
representatives (Colombia was the only country to declare its candidacy in 2006 but finally withdrew 
it in 2007 facing not enough preparation) and (ii) the fact that the CBF (the Brazilian football 
association) is a totally private hold organization without any relationships with public authorities. 
The first consequence is the lack of public figures for the projected LOC’s budget. As a private 
company the CBF, responsible for the organization of the tournament, is not forced to disclosure its 
accounts. The only things that are publicly disclosed at the time are the name of the LOC members 
and the name of the stadiums which will host matches. Even in the official report from the FIFA 
inspection committee it is clearly mentioned that “unlike most previous bids, there is no evidence of 
corporate support through sponsorship of the bid. It may be that this is intentional and that the bid 
LOC has not sought financial support from corporate Brazil”19. 
The only thing we know for sure is that the FIFA inspection committee confirmed the budget 
presented by the Brazilian’s LOC. 
B. The Brazilian OCOG’s budget (Olympic Games) 
 
The budget for the Rio 2016 Olympic Games was presented in 2010 by the Brazilian committee to the 
finance inspection committee of the IOC. The financial results from previous Games (Beijing, Athens 
and Sydney) along with outcomes from the 2007 Pan American Games organized in Rio have been 
used to prepare this budget. The Brazilian government and public authorities (State, City 
governments) are fully involved in the organization of the games and they have signed letters of 
guarantee that stipulate that they are committed to (i) fund the OCOG, (ii) invest in the needed 
infrastructures and (iii) cover any unexpected economic shortfall. 
The budget has been established in Brazilian Real and then converted into US dollar. All the 
estimates of revenues and expenditures have been prepared taking into account the evolution of the 
economic environment in Brazil including the expected inflation rate. This has been done thanks to 
the projected figures of the National System of Consumer Price Indices, the Central Bank of Brazil and 
the National Monetary Committee. The inflation target of the Central Bank was 4.5% for 2010 (the 
real CPI inflation rate for 2010 was 5.04%) and 3.5% for the years 2011 to 2016. Coverage protective 
policy has been adopted by the committee to limit financial risks of exchange rates variation. 
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The budget is of course balanced. The total revenues expected reach USD 2.8 billion. The big novelty 
is that it breaks with past editions where OCOGs were almost exclusively private funded. The budget 
presented by the Brazilian OCOG includes public money (25%) brought to the table by Federal, State 
and Cities authorities (one-thirst each). The IOC’s contribution only represents 31% of the total 
budget. 
Table.10 Brazilian’s OCOG budget 20 
 
C. Public and private investments needed 
 
In this part will be analyzed the public and private investments (stadiums, airports, roads, venues…) 
needed to ensure the good organization of the two events.  
The first thing to be mentioned is the fact that Brazil will use the efforts made in the previous Pan 
American Games (2007) and CISM World Military Games (2011) which can guarantee the early 
execution of some infrastructures that will be used during the World Cup and the Games. We remind 
you here that temporary venues are in charge of the organizing committees.  
There are very significant differences between the involvements of public authorities in the funding 
of World Cup and Olympic Games. During the bidding process for the organization of the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup, the Brazilian government announced that the tournament will be entirely privately 
funded except the eventual transport, security or medical infrastructures that could eventually 
improve the local situation and/or be useful for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. 
1. 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 
 
 The main investments needed for the organization of the World Cup are stadiums construction 
and/or renovation. Facing the beginning of the 2007 economic crisis and the first bad feedbacks from 
the organization’s report of the Pan American games government and the CBF (the Brazilian football 
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Revenues (Millions) %
BRL USD BRL USD
IOC Contribution 1 742   871      2 338   1 010   31%
Broadcasting 1 164   582      1 563   675      21%
TOP Sponsorship 578      289      775      335      10%
OCOG Own Revenues 1 838   919      2 467   1 065   33%
Domestic Sponsorship 1 026   513      1 377   595      18%
Ticketing 722      361      969      418      13%
Licensing 90         45         121      52         2%
Public subsidies 1 383   693      1 857   804      25%
Federal Government 461      231      619      268      8%
State Government 461      231      619      268      8%
City Government 461      231      619      268      8%
Other 667      334      896      387      12%
TOTAL 5 630   2 817   7 558   3 266   100%
2008 2016
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association) decided together to give priority to private funding or eventually to private-public 
partnerships (the famous PPPs). 
Concerning the stadiums a first list of candidate cities to the hosting of matches has been presented 
and some first contacts have been taken with eventual private companies. At the time of the bid 
(2007) eighteen cities were officially candidates.  
Graph.9 Brazilian’s candidates’ cities 21 
 
The final decision on the cities selected to host matches has been announced in May 2009. Twelve 
cities have been chosen. 
Few cities have provided information about the total amount of money needed to restore and/or 
build stadiums. Public information about this issue is quite impossible to be found. The FIFA just 
disclosed that according to an estimate made during the bid process by the LOC USD 1.1 billion were 
needed. This money had to be brought by the private sector since the government announced that 
he will not fund this part of the organization of the Cup. Two years after Brazil was chosen to 
organize the cup most of the stadiums had not found yet private investors interested in injecting the 
money needed in the upgrading or building of the stadiums. Because of this lack in funds the 
Brazilian government decided to intervene through the Bank for Social and Economic Development 
(BNDES for Banco de Desenvolvimento Economica e Social) which will lend money to corporations at 
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a rate defined by the government. This rate (Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo) is around 6% which is 
much lower than the interest rate asked by the market to fund the Brazilian Treasury (around 10%). 
This mechanism is a way for the government to subsidize corporations investing in stadiums. Here is 
the final map of the cities hosting matches during the competition.  
Graph.10 Brazilian’s chosen cities 22 
 
Finally the total investment in infrastructures related to the FIFA World Cup according to a survey 
conducted by the ministry of sport in 2010 would reach USD 18 billion of which 68% (USD 12.18 
billion) will come from federal money (federal financing and general federal budget). Investments 
can be split into civil infrastructure (USD 12.4 billion) and services (USD 5.6 billion). The allocation of 
these funds through the different types of infrastructures is detailed in the figure below. 
Graph.11 2014 World Cup infrastructure investments 23 
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2. 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro 
 
The situation concerning the involvement of public authorities in the investments needed for the 
Olympic Games is much clearer. From the start the Brazilian government was actively involved in the 
organization of the games both by providing Rio with the entire infrastructures needed and 
supporting the local OCOG through a financial participation to its operating budget. The 
infrastructures take also advantage of the previous organization of the World Cup, at least for some 
civil infrastructures (airports, roads…). 
The repartition of the funding between the different public authorities has been organized this way: 
the three different levels of public governmental institutions (Federal, State and City) are in charge of 
(i) the permanent venues and facilities, (ii) the international broadcast center/main press center 
(IBC/MPC), (iii) the training venues and (iv) the transport and related infrastructures. The other public 
institution involved is the Caixa Economica Federal (CEF) which is the public owned Savings Bank of 
Brazil. The CEF is responsible for the funding of the (i) Olympic Village and (ii) the Barra Media 
Village. The total investment represents USD 11.6 billion. USD 11 billion are dedicated to capital 
investments such as airports, accommodation etc. The rest of the money will be used for operations 
expenditures such as security or decoration of the city. 
Table.11 2016 Olympic Games infrastructure investments (in 2008 and 2016 value) 
 
The main expenses are dedicated to civil infrastructures like airports, roads or railways (47% of the 
total amount of public money invested). The set up of environmental management systems aiming to 
adapt Rio to the future environmental stakes represent another high part of these investments. The 
Investments (millions) %
BRL USD BRL USD
Capital Investments 22 118   11 058   29 692   12 826   95,2%
Airports, ports 2 003     1 001     2 688     1 161     8,6%
Roads and railways 8 903     4 451     11 951   5 163     38,3%
Accomodation 111         56           150         65           0,5%
Sport Venues 980         490         1 316     569         4,2%
Olympic Village 854         427         1 147     495         3,7%
Barra Media Village 1 625     812         2 181     942         7,0%
Power infrastructure 1 540     770         2 067     893         6,6%
Environmental Mgt Systems 2 410     1 205     3 235     1 397     10,4%
Medical 20           10           27           12           0,1%
Security 1 626     813         2 183     943         7,0%
IBM/MPC 406         203         545         235         1,7%
Urban legacy 1 640     820         2 202     951         7,1%
Operations 1 117     559         1 500     647         4,8%
Security 875         437         1 174     507         3,8%
Cultural programme 45           23           61           26           0,2%
Decoration of the city 24           12           32           14           0,1%
Special projects 173         87           233         100         0,7%
TOTAL 23 235   11 617   31 192   13 473   100,0%
2008 2016
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sport venues with an amount of USD 490 million only represent 4% of the total budget. The figure 
below establishes a list of all the sport venues concerned. 
Table.12 2016 Olympic Games Sport Venues Investments (in 2008 value) 
 
Finally the total public investment forecasted for the organization of both World Cup and Olympics 
would reach USD 23.8 billion in 2008 value. 
  
Sport Venues (USD millions) %
New installations Upgradings TOTAL
Olympic Training Center 195                         -               195   39,8%
Olympic Hockey Center 1                              -               1        0,2%
Olympic Tennis Center 46                            -               46     9,4%
Rio Olympic Velodrome -                           35               35     7,1%
Maria Lenk Aquatic Center -                           9                 9        1,8%
Olympic Aquatics Stadium 38                            -               38     7,8%
Lagoa Rodrigo De Freitas -                           2                 2        0,4%
Marina Da Gloria -                           9                 9        1,8%
Sambodromo -                           13               13     2,7%
Joao Havelange Stadium -                           41               41     8,4%
National Equestrian Center -                           11               11     2,2%
National Shooting Center -                           3                 3        0,6%
Olympic Whitewater Stadium 26                            -               26     5,3%
Olympic BMX Center 7                              -               7        1,4%
Deodoro Arena 41                            -               41     8,4%
Deodoro Modern Pentathlon Park 2                              -               2        0,4%
Training Venues 11                            -               11     2,2%
TOTAL 367                         123             490   100,0%
2008
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IV. Risks and opportunities for the Brazilian socio-economic 
environment 
 
A. The current economic and social situation in Brazil 
 
1. Economic evolution 
 
According to the World Bank Brazil is the eighth largest global economy with a GDP of 2.180 billion in 
2010. From the early forms of industry (timber, sugar cane etc.), Brazil evolved to become a modern 
and dynamic economy. 
Brazil experienced two different situations in the 1970’s: (i) a massive influx of capital from the 
United States, Europe and Japan that has been used to subsidize state companies and build more 
infrastructures in the poorest areas to encourage economic take-off and (ii) an accumulation in the 
external debt due to the oil shocks. The immediate result has been significant: GDP grew over 8% per 
year over the decade of 1970, despite the double oil crash. 
However, Brazil experienced a turnaround during the end of the dictatorship in the 1980’s and was 
forced to restrict its spending. This crisis has fueled an increase in inflation and a significant increase 
in the debt burden, before some economic austerity measures are taken to stabilize the currency. In 
the early 1980’s, the Brazilian economy was first hit by hyperinflation. 1985, the inflation rate 
reached 56% in January, 73% in February, and 84% in March. March 15th the new president is 
elected and the next day, he presented an ambitious stabilization program including, among others, 
a deep currency reform. Three months later, obviously, this project did not meet the expectations of 
its authors: indeed, inflation resumed in the same way as before, along with a new recession which 
was different from previous ones. At the end of this episode in 1987, the government negotiated an 
agreement with its creditors to reschedule debt payments, after suspending its payments. The 
agreement did not have the expected results, but was nevertheless enough for the total economic 
output ensures a trade surplus to cover the interests of the debt. 
In the 1990’s, Brazil has led a tight fiscal policy, but the consequences of the 1998 financial crisis in 
Southeast Asia has forced the government to devaluate its currency, the Real, to gain 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Under pressure from the IMF, Brazil gradually reduced its 
public debt, which came from 57% in 2003 to 51% in 2005. Inflation is under control since 
1994. Interest rates remain high with the rate of the Brazilian central bank around 11% in le last 
decade. Final borrowers may be subject to interest rates around 25%. These rates, which show that 
financial institutions still fear a return of slides, weigh on growth, which varies between 0% and 5% 
since the mid 1990. 
In the 2000’s the budgetary situation has led Brazil to announce (March 2005) it would not use a new 
IMF loan. The austerity policy conducted by the finance minister Antonio Palocci, but disapproved by 
the President Lula's electoral base and part of business, has allowed the Brazilian economy to display 
historical trade surpluses. Interest rates, despite having begun a significant decline in recent years 
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are still high around 9.5% in May 2010. Brazil has nevertheless entered a virtuous economic circle 
with low inflation and low interest (in comparison with the recent past), a high rate of growth, falling 
unemployment and rising incomes. This economic success also is the consequence of a political 
consensus between former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) and his successor Lula 
(2003-2010) on the economic policy to apply. 
“The service sector is the largest component of GDP at 66.8 percent, followed by the industrial sector 
at 29.7 percent (2007). Agriculture represents 3.5 percent of GDP (2008). Brazilian labor force is 
estimated at 100.77 million of which 10 percent is occupied in agriculture, 19 percent in the industry 
sector and 71 percent in the service sector”.24 
 
2. Economic Situation 
 
The current objective of the monetary authorities is to reduce the Real appreciation in order to avoid 
“hot money” as much as possible. According to analysts the outlook for the national economy is 
positive and the next organization of World Cup and Olympic Games are considered as a positive 
source for the local economic growth in the future. The conclusion of a recent study made in June 
2011 by the Canadian agency EDC (Export Development Canada) is the following: 
“The outlook for the Brazilian economy is positive. Over the short-term, downside risks are associated 
with a rapid deterioration in the current account balance that leave the country more exposed to 
adverse financial conditions. The government also needs to prevent the formation of asset bubbles in 
the economy while banking regulators deal with rising household indebtedness and debt servicing 
costs relative to income. In the medium-term, both private and public consumption will continue to 
grow faster than GDP, posing pressures on domestic production capacity and prices. More investment 
will be needed to keep up with increasing domestic demand. Some structural reforms need to be 
undertaken to ensure sustainable growth and improve fiscal accounts. The FIFA World Cup and the 
Olympics will offer excellent opportunities for exporters and investors in Brazil over the next 5-7 
years”25. 
Table.13 Brazilian Economic Indicators26 
 
                                                          
24
 « Economy of Brazil » Wikipedia article - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Brazil 
25
 EDC – Brazil General Information (June 2011) 
26
 Source : EIU, EDC Economics 
Economic Indicators 2005 - 2009 2010 2011 (forecast) 2012 (forecast)
Real GDP growth 3,5% 7,5% 4,6% 4,5%
Inflation 5,1% 5,0% 6,6% 6,0%
Budget Balance 2,7% -2,1% -2,1% -2,1%
Export of goods 11,2% 32,0% 6,0% 6,0%
Import of goods 18,1% 42,3% 30,2% 15,2%
Current Account Bal. (% of GDP) -0,1% -2,3% -2,7% -3,5%
Reserves (months of CA debits) 8,8 11,8 9,8 8,8
External debt (% of GDP) 17,9% 16,6% 16,1% 17,3%
Exchange rate (to US $) 2,1 1,8 1,7 1,8
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Graph.12 Brazil’s current account balance (US $ vs Real)27 
 
3. Balance of payments 
 
For a long time has Brazil not been a country open to trade. The idea that Brazil is a very big country, 
big enough to stand on its own has prevailed for many years. From the 1930s, the economic 
development model adopted by Brazil relied on a policy of industrialization based on imports 
substitution. In terms of trade policy, this approach resulted in a strong border protection (tariffs, 
quotas, import ban, etc.) to limit imports of goods that could compete with those produced on 
national territory. Domestic producers, isolated from international competition, were thus protected. 
This protectionist policy has also had a negative impact on the export sector in Brazil. Indeed, exports 
did not benefit from any measure of support and were even hampered by restrictive measures such 
as taxes on exports. Until the late 80's these policies have resulted in a low degree of trade openness: 
10% of GDP rate. 
The change of economic model, characterized by openness and a liberalization of the Brazilian 
economy, has taken place gradually from the early 1990s. This shift has had a significant impact on 
trade policy measures as restrictions on imports and exports have been reduced or eliminated. In 
consequence, trade flows have increased significantly and the degree of trade liberalization in Brazil 
rose from 11% in 1980 to 28% in 2004. 
The country's trade balance has been in surplus since 2000. This surplus is mainly due to the export 
of agricultural products. Thus the evolution of Brazil's trade balance since 2000 matches the 
evolution of agricultural prices. The balance of trade in industrial products has a structural deficit for 
the country but the structure of the balance of primary products and the rising prices of raw 
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Graph.13 Brazil’s trade balance 28 
 
 
4. Social situation 
 
The extent of poverty in Brazil was estimated at 35% of the population in 199929 (in the method used 
by Gradin is poor who has an income 60% below the median. Poverty is thus measured in relative 
rather than absolute). It then declined significantly: 26.9% in 2006, 25.1% in 2007 according to the 
PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra of Domicílios). The decline is undeniable and it occurred 
mainly during the presidency of Lula. The evolution of poverty depends on three factors: the level of 
inequality, their evolution and finally the growth of the economy. 
Regarding the level of inequality the higher it is the harder it is to reduce poverty. However, Brazil is 
one of the most unequal countries in the world. Only looking at the earned income, the Gini 
coefficient30 was 0.53 in 2006 when he was around 0.30 in South Korea, around 0.45 in the USA, 0.32 
in France and 0.39 in Portugal. The high level of inequality is therefore a negative factor that makes it 
harder to reduce poverty. 
The second factor is the change in inequality. The more inequality declines, the more poverty 
declines. Reducing inequality has also played for the decline in poverty levels.  
The third factor is the growth of the economy. The higher the growth rate is, the greater the 
reduction of poverty will be. Yet Lula's Brazil has indeed taken advantage from higher and less 
volatile growth than in the 1990s, at least until 2008. The last two factors are causing a significant 
reduction in poverty despite a level of inequality which remains high. The reduction in inequality is 
the result of improved working conditions, both in terms of employment and wages, and a significant 
increase in the minimum wage over the period. The effect of social transfers on inequality and thus, 
on the level of poverty is modest.  Targeted social programs (the famous “Bolsa Familia” for example) 
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have reduced by only 6.4% the number of poor in Brazil31, but their situation has improved. The 
“depth” of poverty has declined. 
Brazil presents strong geographical and sociological contrasts. While much of the territory is covered 
by the Amazon rainforest virtually empty of human beings, the southeastern coast is home to the 
mega-cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and one of the largest "urban areas" around the city of 
Belo Horizonte. Like it was said before economic inequalities are among the highest in the world and 
racial segregation even if informal does exist. 
 
B. Expected economic impacts on GDP and balance of payments?  
1. Methodology and definitions 
 
In this thesis the analysis will be focused on the tangible and non-tangible impacts of the two events 
on the Brazilian economy and society. It is useful to consider on one side the tangible impact and on 
the other side the non-tangible impacts. 
Tangible impacts include economic impacts such as new investments, increase in tourism and new 
opportunities for business but also better and/or new infrastructure. Economic impact is considered 
to be “the total amount of additional expenditure generated within an area, which could be directly 
attributable to the staging of a particular event”32. 
The most obvious non tangible impact is the world image of Brazil. The country will be in the 
spotlight because of the worldwide media cover of the two events. Such impacts also include skills 
improvements, sport and cultural activities development, environmental impacts and eventual 
increase in HDI through better medical installation etc. The national pride could also be boosted: 
particularly focusing on short-term consequences, it appears for instance that a final victory in a 
World Cup can have positive impacts on the morale of a population. In a sense, the high morale of a 
population will be an important factor in consumption and therefore economic growth. This 
could especially be true for Brazil, a country in which sport is a second religion. These non-tangible 
impacts will only be dealt with in the third part of this report through the environmental and social 
impacts of the two events. 
This section particularly focuses on the expected economic impacts and more specifically on the 
potential increase in GDP generated by the events. The non tangible impacts will be analyzed in 
section C. Social and Environmental Impacts it is useful to distinguish two different types of economic 
impacts: direct impacts and indirect impacts. Direct impacts are those “directly” connected to the 
event whereas indirect impacts are those which are responsible for stimulus on the economy thanks 
to the organization of these events. 
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The methodology used in this part consists in presenting the official forecasts disclosed by public 
authorities and then commenting on them using evaluations and reports of previous such mega-
sporting events and opinions from experts which measure the economic impact of those old cases.  
 
Graph.14 Brazil Benefits from Olympics and World Cup 
 
 
Previous editions of the Games and World Cup have demonstrated that positive impacts on local 
economies are likely to be expected. These positive impacts derive from an increase in the flow of 
money into the domestic economies. This increasing demand responsible for the increasing GDP 
comes from an increasing consumption and increasing investments.  
The estimate of direct impacts on GDP is also established with (i) the identification and valuation of 
investments made up for the two events and (ii) the calculation of forecasted increase in 
consumption because of the events.  
The estimate of indirect impacts can be done with several ways. The Brazilian Ministry of Sport 
disclosed a study about the expected economic impact of the 2014 World Cup in which indirect 
impacts are established with the notion of “multiplier effect”. This notion of multiplier effect is based 
on the fact that the new money brought to the economy and responsible for the previous direct 
impacts is re-spent inside the domestic economy. This recirculation of money is generating job 
creations, an increased demand from companies as well as an increased consumption from the local 
working population benefiting from the increase in sales of domestic companies. This all means 
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Graph.15 Money recirculation: the multiplier effect33 
 
2. Expected increase in GDP: figures and forecasts 
 
a) The official forecasts 
 
(1) 2014 FIFA World Cup  
 
The Brazilian Ministry of Sport disclosed a study describing the figured economic impact of the FIFA 
World Cup in Brazil. Four different categories will impact the national GDP: infrastructure, private 
services, tourism and internal consumption. 
For each category some variables have been identified by to estimate the impact on GDP. For 
example the variables identified for the “tourism” category are “quantity of tourists expected”, 
“length of stay” and “average consumption”. Once these variables have been identified a formula 
calculates the expected impact on GDP using the estimates for each variable. A logic tree for 
understanding the impacts (direct and indirect) of the World Cup is presented below. The indirect 
impacts are estimated using the multiplier method. Multipliers have been calculated with a statistical 
model that has already been used for other sporting events. They are then applied to the direct 
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Graph.16 World Cup direct economic impacts: logic tree34 
 
According to this study the total economic impact of the FIFA World Cup is likely to be around USD 
100 billion over the period concerned (2010-2014) which represents around 1% of the GDP projected 
over the period. This amount is split between direct impacts accounting for USD 25.95 billion and 
indirect impacts accounting for USD 74.15 billion.  
Graph.17 World Cup total impact35 
 
This direct impact should represent 0.26% of the projected GDP over the period. It is generated by (i) 
the investments related to the World Cup (USD 18 billion, see upper) and (ii) a forecasted increase in 
consumption. This increase in consumption comes from (i) domestic consumption pushed up by job 
creations and increased salaries (due to an increase in companies’ sales) and (ii) tourist’s 
consumption (domestic and international). The total additional domestic consumption forecasted is 
around USD 2.73 billion. This has been calculated by multiplying the estimated amount of job 
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creation with the expected average salary (total income of new employees) and the forecasted 
consumption rate (the total income of new employees is excepted to reach USD 4.57 billion and the 
consumption rate is established at 59.7%). Around 4 million additional tourists related to the FIFA 
World Cup have been forecasted for the period generating USD 5.14 billion in consumption. 
Graph.18 World Cup tourism economic impact36 
 
The total indirect impact should represent 0.75% of the projected GDP over the period. This has 
been calculated using (i) the multiplier method to estimate the multiplying effect of the World Cup 
and (ii) future demand generated over the 2014-2019 period. The multipliers used have been chosen 
using the previous outcomes of the former World Cups. 
Graph.19 World Cup indirect impact 37
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(2) 2016 Olympic Games 
 
A survey conducted by the local OCOG with the University of Saõ Paulo has used the same 
methodology to forecast the economic impact of the Games on the Brazilian economy. A total 
amount of BRL 90 billion is expected to be injected into the local economy taking into account 
indirect investments and their long-term effects. This is expected to impact the GDP at USD billion 11 
over the 2009-2016 period and USD 13.5 billion over the 2016-2020 period. 
The main industries impacted are “the construction sector, which will increase by 10.5 percent, 
followed by real estate (6.3 percent), then services (5.7 percent), oil and gas (5.1 percent), 
transportation and communications (4.8 percent)”38. 
This figure is much bigger than the one provided by another study from Crédit Suisse. According to 
the Swiss bank the election of Rio de Janeiro as host city for the 2016 Olympic Games is expected to 
cause a sharp increase in foreign investment in the country. The study estimates an R$30 Billion 
financial input over the next seven years.  
b) Is the Brazilian Government too much confident? 
 
(1) 2014 World Cup 
 
In order to assess the impact of the 2014 World Cup and to challenge the estimates of the Brazilian 
government it can be useful to use studies about the real economic impacts of World Cups in South 
Africa and Germany (2010 and 2006). The best event to be used as a gauge for these effects seems to 
be Germany. In fact even if the sizes of the two economies are different it might be too early in 2011 
to have a reliable retrospective look at the effects of the 2010 World Cup on South African economy. 
Only the predictable direct impacts can be challenged since the multiplier effects is a tool which is 
really hard to estimate even after the end of the event.  
The figures and estimates presented in the section II.C.1) can be used to assess the validity of the 
figures disclosed by Brazilian officials. 
The first conclusion that can be made is that actual impacts of such an event are often lower than 
those predicted. There is an exception with the number of tourists that went to Germany. They were 
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Table.14 2006 World Cup and 2014 World Cup comparisons 
  
Regarding the economic impact provided by the Brazilian government, the overall figures seem 
reasonable. Indeed it represents 0.25% of projected GDP which is exactly the final outcome of 2006 
World Cup in Germany (for information relating to preliminary figures the World Cup in South Africa 
added a 0.7% contribution towards the local GDP). 
However the Brazilian government's optimism must be tempered by the greater risk taken by the 
country and a lower “return” because of the amounts committed by the government. In Germany 
the impact on GDP represents 150% of public expenditures related to the World Cup. The same ratio 
only reaches 50% in Brazil. This means that even if public projections are reached in Brazil the impact 
on GDP would be twice as less as the public expenses related to the event which represents a less 
return for Brazil. 
Another point made by the Brazilian government that should be qualified is the expenditure 
generated by the tourism related to the World Cup. The Brazilian government expects a 14% increase 
in tourist numbers which seems reasonable (25% in Germany and 35% in South Africa). However the 
money spent in Germany by foreign tourists was around 600 million Euros with an average of € 300 
per foreign tourist. The Brazilian government figures with a total contribution of 5.14 billion dollars 
and 3.7 million additional tourists therefore provide an average expenditure of $ 1,400 per tourist. 
More specifically 600K international tourists are expected spending on average $ 3,550 each and 3.1 
million Brazilian tourists spending $ 970 each. This figure of $ 3550 seems particularly high compared 
to the traditional average for Brazilian tourism which is $ 1,590. Recall that in Germany the average 
expenditure was € 300 which is below the average in “normal times” (about € 1,000). 
To conclude even if government's projections are conservative with a minimal impact on GDP (0.25% 
for the direct and 1% for the total impacts), the economic optimism of the Brazilian government 
should be tempered because of (i) tourism revenues that may be overstated (tourism revenues is an 
important variable in the total economic impact) and (ii) public expenditures that are much higher 
than for most of the previous World Cup editions and that increase the level of economic risk. In fact 
public expenditures related to the World Cup are mostly debt funded at an average rate of 8%.  
 
- 40 - 
 
(2) 2016 Olympic Games 
 
Concerning the Olympic Games in Rio the official figures disclosed are not precise enough to be really 
appreciated. Furthermore this is almost impossible to predict the economic impact of such an event 
more than five years before it occurs. The figures presented by the Brazilian Ministry of Sports, USD 
25 billion added to the GDP, represents 0.08% of the predicted GDP over the period (2009 – 2020) 
which seems a quite conservative forecast. This percentage corresponds to the average noticed in 
Greece after the 2004 Olympics in Athens and the 2008 Olympics in Beijing (see section II.C.1). In fact 
the impact presented by post-event reports is always between 0.09% and 1% depending on the year 
taken into account. 
This figure is also much less high than those disclosed for the World Cup (0.08% versus 0.25%). One 
other important difference between Olympics and World Cup is the geographical dispersion of the 
economic impacts. In fact Olympics activities are almost all located near Rio whereas World Cup 
tournament will host games all over Brazil; this will be dealt with in section C of this part.  
 
3. Balance of payments: which impacts? 
 
Regarding the position of the current trade balance in 2011, government expenditures related to the 
World Cup should draw in imports. In fact raw materials accounts in average for 45% of the total 
Brazilian imports. Given the fact that Brazilian government expenditures related to the World Cup 
and the Olympics are directed towards infrastructures it is likely for Brazilian imports to increase in 
the next seven years. One other reason of a likely deterioration in the balance of trade is the 
expected increase in households’ incomes which will also lead to more imports. As expected, when 
consumption rises, imports are likely to rise also. As a result, the exchange rate of the Brazilian Real 
could depreciate. 
Regarding this balance of trade, opinions diverge on the real impact of World Cup and Olympics. 
Some economists (Ilan Goldfajn for example) think that impacts of such events could be insignificant 
compared to one other scenario: the collapse of agricultural prices. Indeed, the positive balance 
comes from the Brazilian agricultural exports… 
 
C. Social and environmental impacts 
 
1. Geographical and social imbalances 
 
If it seems clear that the organization of these events should help Brazil improve its planning, 
this will be unequally. In fact, only certain geographic areas will directly benefit from improved 
infrastructure. The city of Rio de Janeiro will be “two-times” promoted as it will host the two 
events. Of course this is not additive, since much of the infrastructure will be used a second time 
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and not being rebuilt leading to a lower economic impact. The organization of the 2014 World 
Cup will promote the development of hotel facilities, airports and renovation of the legendary 
Maracana stadium while receiving the 2016 Olympic and Paralympics Games will significantly 
improve urban transport. Then come the host cities for the 2014 World Cup (and even more 
cities which will also host some Olympic events football, see the map in section II.C.1) that will 
get many improvements of their infrastructure. However only taking into account the urban 
population of these twelve cities, it means that only 12% of Brazilians will directly benefit from 
improved infrastructure at their disposal. Thus, if the organization of this sporting event helps 
increase the country's economic growth over the long term, it is not yet ensured that this growth 
will be re-distributed equitably and so increase existing inequalities in Brazil. The social 
imbalance in Brazil is one of the most high over the world. There are no existing studies about 
the likely impact of the two events on this situation but the economic benefit for the population 
will be better infrastructure and maybe work. These will only impact classes of population that 
already have skills to work and that have enough buying power to use these infrastructures and 
to consume.   
2. The stake of sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development has become a central issue for all businesses but also for sporting events. 
The carbon footprints of the last mega-sporting events were catastrophic. While the 2008 Olympic 
and Paralympics Games in Beijing had a footprint record with nearly 1.4 million tones of CO2, the 
2010 World Cup in South Africa has produced nearly the double (2.75 million tones of CO2)! This sad 
performance impacted consciousness. While the choice of South Africa has been criticized by the 
distance of this country and its large size (which forced the departure of more than 2,000 daily 
interior aircrafts to allow the conduct of the World Cup 2010), new applications want to be “green”, 
that is to say, with a neutral carbon footprint. 
Indeed, this has become a criterion for the election of a city or a country. The city of Rio de Janeiro 
had early enough understood the interest to position itself as a green city. Thus, a few days before 
the IOC's choice for the designation of the 2016 Olympics’ host city the environment Minister Carlos 
Minc said that "Brazil has an action plan against global climate change along with carbon reduction 
targets. We will win the 2016 Games in Rio de Janeiro and achieve a fully green competition"39. To 
convince the jury of the IOC, Brazil then proceeded to plant 3850 trees to offset the 716 tones of CO2 
produced by the Rio 2016 during the preparation of the bid between September 2007 and October 
2009. It was an opportunity for the Rio 2016 Committee to launch its "Zero Carbon Rio 2016" 
operation. This particular project involves the systematic use of biofuels for the operation of buses in 
host cities. 
Thus, it appears that the two Organizing Committees are concerned about the impacts of the events 
on the environment as a result of the organization and conduct of these events. This was also the 
case during the 2010 World Cup. Indeed, Manal Blessing, head of planning for the World Cup 2010, 
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stated that "the World Cup will not start if there is no way to do it green"40. For this, he presented a 
list of "Green Goals" to offset CO2 emissions. However these environmental plans have been 
criticized from the start for their inadequacy and their inconsistency and the result has been 
environmentally catastrophic... Brazil should focus on meeting these green objectives if it does not 
want popularity of these events to fall. 
  
                                                          
40
 http://www.ipsnouvelles.be/print.php?idnews=10648 




Will Brazil take advantage of these two events? After studying the socioeconomic aspects of these 
two events the first certainty is that it is extremely difficult a few years before the events to measure 
the potential impact of these events on the Brazilian economy and society. 
Recent editions, whether for the World Cup or the Olympic Games, have demonstrated that effective 
organization usually is enough to improve the visibility and attractiveness of the country. This is one 
of the first objectives of the Brazilian government. It is almost certain that if an effective 
management is set up Brazil will be in the spotlight of the world which will be likely to have a positive 
impact both on tourism and on the status of Brazil in the world. Brazil has significant natural assets 
which are not enough highlighted. From this point of view the organization of the two events is very 
likely to highlight them enabling the country to achieve its first objective. 
In pure economic terms, Brazil being a growing country, the first responsibility for the government 
and the organizing committees is not to slow down the economic growth. Investments made by the 
government and the private sector were made in this direction. However, the effectiveness of 
measures depends on a number of important factors. It will only be possible to fully appreciate the 
economic consequences of these organizations after several years. Despite this uncertainty the 
Brazilian government was smart enough not to exaggerate the potential positive impacts of such 
events. The economic simulations presented by government agencies appeared to be reasonable 
regarding the past editions and the current situation of the country. Certainly there are risks, 
particularly because of heavy investments supported by the government and because of the 
situation of the Brazilian economy, still in development, but if they have not been put forward by 
official reports (of course!), they were also not offset by complacency. Regarding the balance of trade 
the organization of the two events should have a minor impact. In fact an increase in imports is likely 
to happen in order to build the entire necessary infrastructure but the impact should be negligible.  
Finally as regards to Brazilian society it appears that current disparities will not be erased. It is even 
possible that some particular geographical inequalities are exacerbated by the organization of these 
two events because of the territorial distribution of sites hosting the competition and lack of 
effectiveness of the redistribution in the country. Still society as a whole may legitimately expect an 
improvement in its overall situation. 
Some further work could be done to improve the quality of the estimates assessment and also to 
provide specific estimates. A fully economic study using tools like I-O method or General Equilibrium 
could give a more precise estimate of the likely economic impact of these two major events. These 
models however need knowledge and tools that are impossible to be used in a master Thesis like this 
one. Anyway with the information disclosed in this Thesis my personal opinion is that Brazil has a lot 
to gain from the organization of these events. The main question is the attendance in these events 
and the ability of Brazil government to provide new infrastructure with an economic viability use. 
Will these two events really have an impact on the Brazilian tourism? Will Brazil really benefit from 
the entire built infrastructure after the end of the two events? If the answer is yes so I am convinced 
that Brazil will gain from World Cup and Olympics. 
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